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A Broken Promise: Examining the Merit-Aid Policy and
Implementation Gap in the Michigan Promise Scholarship
By Nathan Daun-Barnett, Albert Hermsen, Lori Vedder, and Beth Mabry
In 2006, Michigan changed their traditional merit award to a credit
contingent program based upon successful completion of 60 college
credits. The Michigan Promise Scholarship was crafted by state
policymakers without input from the financial aid community. This
case study suggests that the change in policy resulted in two unin-
tended consequences: 1. an administrative burden for financial aid
offices resulting from the award verification process and 2. a finan-
cial burden for students during the year they are expected to be
eligible for the award. The Scholarship was eliminated in 2011, but




















University at Buffalo. On December 21, 2006, Governor Jennifer Granholm signed theMichigan Promise Grant Act (Act 479) into law, effectivelyguaranteeing $4,000 to every Michigan high school graduate that
completes a full two-years of  college (2006).1 The Michigan Promise
Scholarship (MPS) replaced the less generous Michigan Merit Scholarship
($2,500), but the award was credit contingent, meaning that all or part of  it
was made once 60 credits of  postsecondary coursework were earned at an
approved institution. The policy change went into effect for the high
school graduating class of  2008, meaning the first cohort could earn the 60
credit hours by May 2010, and were eligible for the full $4,000 award.
During the spring of  2010, the Michigan legislature eliminated the MPS
amid a projected budget deficit of  more than $15 billion for 2011. Only a
small number of  students who earned 60 credits in less than two years
actually received the full award before the program was cut from the state
budget. The program was short-lived, but the policy case is particularly
interesting as it is the first merit-aid program based, in whole or in part,
upon completion of  college level courses to earn the award.
This study reports findings from a single case study tracing the develop-
ment, evolution, and decline of  the MPS program and examines changes in
state policy during the early to mid-2000s. The MPS was a failed experi-
ment, but it represents a unique twist on state merit-aid programs that
other states may be tempted to consider, owing to the mechanics of  tying
1 The terms of  the award will be discussed in detail later, but the definition of  two-years of
college is 60 earned credit hours from a qualified postsecondary institution in the state of
Michigan.
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Theoretical
Framework
the grant to successful completion of  postsecondary coursework. In this
study, we ask three questions:
1. How did merit aid become a priority for the Michigan higher
education policy agenda?
2. How did the structure of  the political process inform the design
of the MPS?
3. How did the design of  the program affect implementation for
postsecondary institutions and students?
We argue that the program design was flawed both because of  the broader
statewide political context and a commission with unclear goals for finan-
cial aid. There were also inadequate structures to consider policy alterna-
tives. Additionally, the design of  the program affected its implementation,
which had an effect on both institutions and award-eligible students.
Finally, we conclude that credit-contingent merit aid, from the perspective
of  public universities, may have proven to be a barrier for low-income and
less academically qualified students.
While the subject of  this investigation is a state merit-aid scholarship,
this investigation focuses on the policy process that led to a poorly de-
signed program. We frame this investigation as part of  the policy adoption
literature. In particular, we emphasize the role of  blue ribbon commissions
in the design of  state policy. (The genesis of  the program was a statewide
commission on higher education and economic growth convened by the
Governor in 2004.) Next, we provide a brief  description of  the research
design followed by a discussion of  the state political climate and the
statewide commission on higher education and economic growth, which
led to the adoption of  the new program. The final section considers how
the public universities responded to these challenges and discusses the
eventual elimination of  the program. Overall, MPS was short-lived, but it
employed an interesting twist on the conventional merit-aid program.
This is an important and timely study for two reasons. First, states are
struggling with the rising costs of  college as well as declining or flat state
revenues. This fiscal environment creates a window of  opportunity to re-
examine how they address issues of  affordability. Second, at the time of  its
creation, MPS was the only state sponsored merit-aid program with a
credit contingent component. Others require students to maintain certain
academic standards to maintain an award (e.g., Georgia HOPE scholar-
ship), but none make credit contingency a required element of  the state
merit-aid policy. That variation on the merit-aid concept aligns well with
the growing emphasis on college completion and institutional accountabil-
ity and may be appealing to other states wrestling with issues of  access,
affordability, and degree completion.
Overview
In this study, we are interested in examining two aspects of  the policy
formation process – each of  which we conceptualize differently. First, we
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seek to understand why revision of  the merit-aid program made it to the
public policy agenda in Michigan at that particular time. Kingdon’s (1995)
discussion of  agenda setting and his adaptation of  the “garbage can”
model of  organizational decision-making provide a useful framework for
understanding that process. The agenda-setting process was subjective,
idiosyncratic, and in some cases even chaotic. Applying Kindgon’s theory
to the creation of  MPS, this suggested that the policy formation process
was anything but rational. MPS depended largely on the sociopolitical
context, the subjective understanding of  the problem, the range of  poten-
tial solutions available at the time of  policy design, and the actors in the
policy process. This window of  opportunity made it possible for policy
actors to consider a new merit-aid program even though financial aid was
never part of  the initial agenda for the commission. Powerful forces were
in play keeping an examination of  the rising cost of  college off  the table.
Despite strong political headwinds, the issue was brought to a small ad hoc
subgroup of  the commission that developed the framework for the MPS.
Second, we focus our attention on a particular window of  opportunity –
the creation of the statewide commission on higher education and eco-
nomic growth – and examine how the structure of  this blue ribbon
commission affected the design of  the new merit-aid program. As we shift
our attention to the actual design of  the program, we rely on a more
rational structural framework to examine the effectiveness of  blue ribbon
commissions that suggests policymaking is a rationale process. Here, policy
alternatives are designed in clear response to well-defined problems and are
based on sound theories or rationales. Equally, they assume the right
stakeholders are involved in the process and that policies are effective
solutions to identified problems. Neither of  these theories alone perfectly
describes the policy process at play in the case of  the MPS but, in combi-
nation, moves us closer to understanding how this policy process influ-
enced the design and implementation of  the program and ultimately led to
the adoption of  a signature merit-aid program that would live a very short
life.
Kingdon’s Policy Streams: An Idiosyncratic Approach to Policy
Formation
In his seminal work, Kingdon (1995) argued that research on the
policymaking process focused a great deal of  time and attention on how
decisions are made among policy actors but spent little time attempting to
understand how policy priorities made it to the agenda in the first place.
He claims,
[t]hough a drastic oversimplification, public policymaking can be
considered to be a set of  processes, including at least: 1. the setting of
the agenda, 2. the specification of  alternatives from which a choice is
to be made, 3. an authoritative choice among those specified alterna-
tives, and 4. the implementation of  the decision (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3).
Kingdon (1995) argues that the policy process is not nearly as rational
and sequential as early research assumed. His research found that
policymakers seldom set the agenda by clearly identifying their problems
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and goals, suggesting a range of  policy alternatives, and then weighing the
costs and benefits of  each in order to commit to a specific set of  policy
priorities. Alternatively, he suggests that the agenda setting process is akin
to the chaotic nature of  organizational decision making, described by
Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) as organized anarchies. According to the
adapted model, agenda setting is informed by three separate processes that
evolve independent of  the others – the recognition of  problems, the
identification of  policy solutions, and the existing political climate. These
three streams of  problems, policies, and politics are coupled during
windows of  opportunity that may open or close quickly depending upon a
variety of  factors. Kingdon argues that these streams develop indepen-
dently of  one another where policy solutions may be identified without
explicitly linking to clearly defined goals or a well-defined problem. Advo-
cacy groups, for example, may have a set of  policy priorities before a
problem has even been prioritized on the agenda. At any given moment, a
set of  policy actors may serve either to promote the coupling of  these
streams, or constrain the same set of  processes.
These streams converge at the point when windows of  opportunity
open, either because the problem has been identified and emphasized or
the political context has changed. When these opportunities arise, policy
actors play a critical role coupling solutions with problems and politics. As
Kingdon (1995) recognizes, some windows of  opportunity open in a
predictable fashion; for example; reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act or the change of  leadership on a legislative committee. Other windows
of  opportunity, however, open in far less predictable ways, with the Cherry
Commission being an example of  such. While statewide commissions had
been convened in Michigan in the past, the last to deal with higher educa-
tion policy occurred nearly 20 years earlier.
We argue here that while the agenda setting process was chaotic and
idiosyncratic, consistent with Kingdon’s (1995) theory, the work of  the
Commission was also more formally structured in terms of  the how
commissioners identified problems, considered solutions, and formulated
recommendations. As such, it requires a different framework to consider
how the structure of  this particular policymaking process influenced the
design of  the program. For that, we turn to existing research on blue
ribbon commissions. At this point, it is important to recognize that both
theories provide important insights because individuals do their very best
to impose structure amid the chaos and uncertainty of  larger political
forces. To understand how Michigan chose to adopt the credit contingent
merit-aid program, one must understand both the volatile and unpredict-
able state political context and the rational structure adopted by and for the
commission.
The Structure of Effective Blue Ribbon Commissions: A Rational
Approach
Early work on the formation of  higher education policy examined the
structure and function of  statewide blue ribbon commissions. This work
suggests that commissions vary in terms of  their effectiveness and the
qualities of  the process have a direct influence on the policy alternatives
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that flow from it. Johnson and Marcus (1986) suggest that effective blue
ribbon commissions include: “a. a predetermined lifespan; b. eminent
individuals from a variety of  backgrounds; c. staff  and funds to assist in
fulfilling its charge; d. a charge to investigate and/or to recommend
changes in structures, functions, origins, or processes” (p. iv). They further
assert that an effective commission will include the following characteris-
tics:
 The charge for the commission should be clear and comprehen-
sive;
 The commission should hold enough meetings for members to
fully understand the issues and the potential solutions;
 The commission chair should provide strong leadership;
 The commission staff  should be knowledgeable and appropriate
in number to provide the necessary background research;
 The commission should seek out public opinion;
 The commissions’ report must address the objectives set out in
the charge, adequately articulate the problem, connect recommen-
dations to the problems, and provide evidence where possible;
 Members must be willing to advocate on behalf  of  the report
once it is issued.
Peterson (1983), in an earlier study, was more critical of  blue ribbon
commissions, relative to their effectiveness as tools for policy formation.
Where Johnson and Marcus (1986) focused on the structure of  commis-
sions and its work, Peterson pointed to elements of  the policy process that
affect the ability of the commission to shift from policy design to imple-
mentation. He argued that an effective blue ribbon commission includes:
 An honest and balanced assessment of the nature and scope of
the problem;
 Specific and “adventurous” (innovative) recommendations;
 Fiscally plausible recommendations;
 Sufficient detail to operationalize proposals;
 Organizational changes where appropriate;
 Documentation of  solutions where prior models, theory, or
research exists.
Lane (2008) broadens the definition of commissions to be more inclu-
sive of  a range of  special forums (including task forces, roundtables and
commissions), and challenges the assertion that the pre-determined
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lifespan is a necessary characteristic of  a commission. He examined the
work of  the North Dakota (ND) Roundtable on Higher Education and
defined effectiveness in terms of  creating and sustaining a statewide public
agenda. According to Lane, three conditions were credited for the
sustainability of  the ND public agenda: 1. the group took time to define
the nature of  the relationship among critical interest groups, 2. the
Roundtable produced a written, detailed agenda to guide decision making,
and 3. the Roundtable served as a “face and place” for the agenda to exist
(Lane, 2008, p. vii). Lane’s work builds on the earlier works of  Peterson
(1983) and Johnson and Marcus (1986), but also includes several refine-
ments. For example, Johnson and Marcus (1986) discuss the importance of
research support in terms of  the qualifications of  the researchers and the
time allotted to conduct work. On the other hand, Lane specifically calls
for the effective use of  data to inform the dialogue. Similarly, Johnson and
Marcus (1986) note the importance of  a diverse group of  stakeholders.
Lane contends that the private sector is particularly important to involve in
the process of  creating the public agenda. Several recommendations reflect
a difference in terms of  the duration of  the commission. Where Johnson
and Marcus call for a clearly defined period for the work of  the group,
Lane (2008) suggests that a sustainable public agenda necessitates a
longstanding body that can move the agenda. To do so, Lane suggests that
more attention should be paid to engaging stakeholders, communicating
the agenda and its successes, and clarifying goals as well as assigning
responsibility. These approaches assume that the right structure combined
with an effective policy formation process will result in the design of
effective policy. We argue that these factors are important to consider and
have implications for the design of  policy in particular, but must be
understood in the context of  complex socio-political forces that effectively
impose constraints on the process.
We approach this investigation as a single case study of  a merit-aid pro-
gram in Michigan that was awarded in-part based on high school perfor-
mance, but primarily contingent upon successful completion of  the
equivalent of  two years of  college. Yin (2003) suggests that case studies are
particularly useful when researchers are examining questions of  how or
why. A single case study design is appropriate in this particular circum-
stance because it reflects a unique intersection of  policy and practice and
Michigan is the only state to adopt a credit contingent merit-aid program.
While at least 14 states have adopted merit-aid programs (Ness, 2010), the
MPS was unique because it included the provision that all or part of  the
scholarship was contingent upon the successful completion of  two years
of  in-state postsecondary coursework.
This study draws upon direct observations of  both the policy formation
process during the Cherry Commission and program implementation at
public universities across the state. Our direct observations are triangu-
lated. We use analysis of  legislation and legislative reports, interviews with
key policymakers engaged in the Cherry Commission, and a focus group.
In addition, there is a follow up survey with financial aid directors to
examine why the alternative merit-aid program was adopted and how the
structure of  the new program was likely to affect financial aid offices at
Research
Design
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public universities. The focus group with financial aid directors was semi-
structured within an open-ended question format among representatives
of  all 15 public universities in Michigan. Follow up questions were sent to
each of  the financial aid directors and eight were returned. The follow up
questions were designed to explore more deeply the specific issues identi-
fied during the course of  the focus group related to program implementa-
tion and the challenges campuses faced. Two institutions were considered
to examine the ways in which the design of  the MPS actually affected
implementation at the institutional level. These findings are juxtaposed
with direct observations of  the policy-making process that led to the
formation of  the MPS as well as interviews with key policymakers respon-
sible for the program’s design. After the initial draft of  the study was
complete, it was shared with financial aid directors and key policymakers
involved with the statewide commission. This served as a form of  mem-
ber-checking to ensure our account of  their experiences accurately con-
veyed the experience as they understood it.
We conducted this investigation from the perspective of  public universi-
ties largely as a matter of  convenience – three of  the four authors were
situated within the four-year public sector. We suspect that, given the
nature of  the program, private four-year colleges and universities were
likely to experience the program in similar ways because the aid was
portable to any institution in the state. We also expect that the effects may
have been greater on community colleges because successful students will
leave these institutions at approximately 60 credit hours. At that point, they
are eligible for all or part of  the award.
It is important to recognize the roles and positions of  the researchers
and how they may have influenced the context of  this investigation. In
addition to being situated in the public university sector, three of  the four
researchers were directly involved in aspects of  policy formation and
implementation. The principal investigator served as both the research
coordinator for the statewide commission on higher education and eco-
nomic growth (to which the policy change is commonly linked) and as
convener of  the Financial Aid Officers group for the public universities
through the Presidents Council, State Universities of  Michigan. Two of  the
researchers served as directors of  financial aid during the implementation
of  the new program and its eventual elimination. They were responsible
for packaging the new aid program and ultimately decided how to assist
students when the state eliminated the program altogether. The advantage
is that these first-hand accounts and direct observations make it possible to
consider features of  these programs that are not always well understood or
discussed. At the same time, we recognize that our observations and
insights are viewed through a particular lens that is neither completely
objective nor unbiased. As such, we acknowledge our findings may not
apply equally well across all state or institutional contexts. Rather, we
suggest that the Michigan experience with a credit contingent merit-aid
program should be weighed as one piece of  evidence for any state consid-
ering a similar strategy.
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Michigan Case Context
We begin by considering the historical and political context of  the
Michigan’s first merit aid scholarship, the Merit Scholarship program,
before turning our attention to the events contributing to the reformula-
tion of  the merit program into the Michigan Promise Scholarship. Next,
we consider the features of  the new policy and its implications for students
and institutions. We conclude with recommendations for practitioners and
policymakers who may be responsible for developing or administering
credit-contingent student aid programs in the future. Lastly, we argue that
the financial aid community must be ready to respond when windows of
opportunity arise and financial aid makes its way to the statewide agenda.
The Michigan Merit Scholarship
On June 30, 1999, Governor John Engler signed into law House Bill No.
4666 to create the Michigan merit award scholarship trust fund, an over-
sight board, and the new merit award program. To fund the Michigan
Merit Trust, the state dedicated a portion of  the annual tobacco settlement
revenues.2 Under the terms of  the legislation, every eligible student re-
ceived $2,500 to attend an approved postsecondary institution in the state
of  Michigan or $1,000 to an equivalent institution outside the state.
According to Sec. 4 (1) of  the Michigan Merit Award Scholarship Act, “the
goal of  the board is to increase access to postsecondary education and
reward Michigan high school graduates who have demonstrated academic
achievement (Michigan Legislative Council, 1999).”
To be eligible for the award, students were required to meet one of  three
basic criteria, all of  which were linked to established assessment tests: 1.
any student who passed all four sections of  the Michigan Educational
Assessment Program (MEAP) – reading, writing, math, and science, 2.
passed two or three of  the areas and received an overall score on a stan-
dardized college admissions exam in the top 25%, or 3. passed two or three
sections and received a qualifying score on a nationally recognized job skills
assessment test as designated by the board.
In 2000, The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought suit
against the state of  Michigan (White v. Engler, 2001) claiming that eligibil-
ity defined solely upon test scores was discriminatory and in violation of
Title VI of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964 (American Civil Liberties Union,
2000). Heller and Shapiro (2001) contended that Michigan was in violation
of  the law in two ways. First, African American, Hispanic, and Native
American students were all significantly less likely to be eligible for the
award than White students. Second, they demonstrated that the MEAP was
never validated as a measure of  student achievement; rather it was designed
as a measure of  school district performance. Heller and Shapiro (2001)
found that only 12 percent of African American students qualified for the
Analysis
and Results
2 The tobacco settlement revenues were a result of  a final judgment in favor of  the state in
Kelley Ex Rel. Michigan v. Philip Morris Incorporated, et. al in 1998.
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award while more than 53 percent of  White students met the same stan-
dard. Further, they showed that 93 percent of  all awards were based upon
the first criteria, meaning the alternatives did very little to mitigate any
potential bias of  the MEAP. Despite evidence demonstrating the disparate
impact of  the MEAP, plaintiffs dropped the case against the state because
the Courts had decided that individuals could not bring claims of  disparate
impact under Title VI of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964.3
The Cherry Commission on Higher Education and Economic
Growth
A statewide commission was convened by Governor Jennifer Granholm in
June 2004 and was charged with identifying the best strategies to double
the number of  college graduates in the state within 10 years. Lt. Governor
John Cherry chaired a group of  41 commissioners including eight college
presidents, two district superintendents, presidents of  the state board of
education, the Michigan Education Association, the Detroit Regional
Chamber, and the Henry Ford museum, as well as an array of  education,
business, and public policy leaders from across the state. The commission
staff  included a dozen state policymakers, directors of  special interests, the
Governor’s executive leadership team, a policy director, two senior policy
advisors, a logistics management firm, and a team of  graduate student
researchers.
In addition to doubling the number of  college graduates in 10 years, the
commission was charged with improving alignment between higher
education and the emerging employment opportunities in the state’s
economy. They were to build a dynamic workforce with talents and skills
for the 21st Century (Lt. Governor’s Commission on Higher Education and
Economic Growth, 2004). The commission met for the better part of  six
months and issued a report to the Governor in December 2004 with a slate
of  19 broad recommendations, most of  which represented the plurality of
voices participating in the commission’s work. The Cherry Commission
was not asked to evaluate the merit scholarship or to develop an alternative
program. In fact, financing higher education had been effectively removed
from the conversation in an effort to avoid debates over declining state
support for higher education. Not one of  the four committees addressed
financial aid as part of  their formal work.
However, a small workgroup of  the participation committee was charged
separately and concurrently to consider how best to address financial aid.
They began with the premise that all students should be able to afford a
two-year education. Their work occurred along a parallel track to the
commission. It was never formally vetted by the full body, no hearings on
3 In Alabama, Department of  Public Safety v. Sandoval, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
the context of  English only driver’s tests in Alabama, that individuals may not bring a
private right of  action under Title VI of  the Civil Rights Act. Subsequently, the case
against Michigan was dropped and the state maintained the merit criteria through all
subsequent classes of  students (prior to 2006) who maintained eligibility for the award.
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the topic were convened or expert opinions sought, and no specific
recommendations were made regarding changes to the Michigan Merit
Program. In subsequent years, the former Governor’s administration
attributed changes to the Michigan Merit Scholarship to the Cherry
Commission, but the body played no formal role in the change. There was
no explicit recommendation to the Governor specifically articulating the
need for an alternative program. We argue, consistent with Peterson’s
(1983) framework for effective commissions, that the lack of  specific detail
to operationalize the proposal led to a broad framework untested by
theory, research, or practice.
According to interviews with advisors to the Cherry Commission
process, by the end of  Governor Granholm’s final term in office, the
administration claimed that action had been taken on 17 of  19 recommen-
dations. They suggested that the new Michigan Promise Scholarship had
helped the state to address the first recommendation to make higher
education universally accessible. It effectively became part of  the public
agenda without any formal stamp of  legitimacy from the body to which it
was credited. Because the MPS conversation took place outside of  the
official work of  the commission, only a few commissioners met with the
state Treasury Secretary to develop plans for the new program. The
commission did not include any representatives from the financial aid
community and because the sub-group was not charged with considering
the financial aid issue, no research was solicited and no testimony was
heard on the matter – both of  which were standard practice for the four
workgroups and the full commission.
The Michigan Promise Scholarship
Effective December 21 2006 – just over two years after the final recom-
mendations were issued by the commission – the Michigan Promise Grant
Act (P.A. 479) reconstituted the Michigan Merit program for all eligible
high school graduates beginning during the 2006-07 school year. The
Promise scholarship was similar to its predecessor with a few important
exceptions:
1. Students were eligible for a total of  $4,000, a substantial increase
over the $2,500 offered under the Merit scholarship;
2. Students were only required to take the Michigan Merit Exam
(MME), which replaced the MEAP, and they were no longer
required to achieve a certain level of  proficiency to earn the award;
3. All or part of  the award was contingent upon successful comple-
tion of  two years (or its equivalent) of  college credit while earning
at least a 2.5 GPA (Michigan Department of  Treasury, 2006).
From a policy perspective, all three changes were improvements over the
previous program – increasing the award by 60 percent, eliminating the
testing proficiency requirement, and creating an incentive to complete
college. However, the actual mechanics of  the program introduced unin-
tended consequences that complicated administration of  the program and
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had the potential to introduce barriers to completion for students. Specifi-
cally, section 390.1628 stated that the money was to be disbursed to an
approved postsecondary institution at the point at which the student
successfully demonstrated qualification.
 For students that did not demonstrate proficiency on two or more
sections of  the MME, the entire $4,000 was disbursed to the college or
university when the student became eligible the October following success-
ful completion of  all credits and verification of  the minimum 2.5 GPA.
When students demonstrated proficiency on the MME, the procedure was
similar except that the first two $1,000 disbursements were made at the
beginning of  the first two years in postsecondary education. The guidelines
stipulated that this program did not create an obligation for approved
postsecondary institutions to loan or advance that money to the students.
As will be evident, that gap in the students’ financial aid packages was a
concern to financial aid administrators responsible for packaging student
aid. The credit contingent nature of  the program also introduced an
administrative burden to financial aid offices because students may or may
not have maintained enrollment at the institution by the time the funds
were distributed. While it was not the subject of  this investigation, this was
potentially more problematic for community colleges where many students
graduate or transfer at or near the 60 credit threshold.
Unintended Consequences of the Promise Scholarship
Financial aid administrators in this study were unequivocal in their concern
over the formulation of  this program. The first concern was a more
general criticism of  the merit approach to student assistance. More than
half  of  participants in the focus group commented that a merit-aid
program was not an effective tool because it did not address financial need
– a theme that was repeated in the follow up surveys. From their institu-
tional perspective, it was difficult to meet the financial needs of  low-
income students even when they received the merit award. During the
period under investigation, Michigan had two need-based aid programs
that accounted for about a third of the total student aid in the state – the
Tuition Incentive Program (TIP) was awarded to students whose parents
had qualified for and received Medicaid for at least 18 months in a two year
period while they were in school and the Tuition Grant that was much
larger but was specifically for attendance at independent colleges (Jen,
2008). At the same time, Michigan public four-year tuition rates were
significantly above the national averages. The College Board (Baum & Ma,
2009) reported average in-state tuition at public four-year colleges across
the country was $6,590; the average in Michigan was approximately $8,500
with only one institution (Saginaw Valley State University) falling below the
national average (President’s Council - State Universities of  Michigan,
2009). With higher than average tuition, small need-based aid programs
and a credit contingent merit program, the net tuition in Michigan was
likely to be higher than the national average of  $2,850. Financial aid
officers in the focus group expressed concern that this combination would
force some students out of  school and others to assume levels of  debt
beyond the federally subsidized programs.
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Administrative Burden for Financial Aid Offices
The MPS was in its second year of  funding during the 2009-10 school year.
This was the first cohort of  students eligible for either $2,000 or $4,000
contingent upon meeting the 60 credit hour/2.5 GPA requirements
(Michigan Department of  Treasury, 2006). The enabling legislation indi-
cated that no undue burden should be placed upon the institution to
provide additional loans or other forms of  aid, but it provided no guidance
regarding how to package the aid. At the same time, legislation stipulated
that the monies were to be disbursed to the institutions once the student
applied for and demonstrated eligibility to receive the award. If, for ex-
ample, a student completed 60 credits and earned a 2.5 in December 2008,
the institution received the award for that student in October 2009.
Financial aid directors at the public four-year institutions expressed
concerns that eligible students would leave school or transfer to another
institution by the time the money was available. However, the institution
was required to make payment to the student even if  they were not cur-
rently enrolled. Follow up conversations confirmed that this was true for
some students, but the award did not last long enough for many students
to qualify – as such, the reimbursement process never became a significant
issue. Though we did not speak to financial aid directors at community
colleges, their challenge was potentially greater. A student that completed
60 hours at a community college could earn a degree and terminate
enrollment or transfer to another institution. The burden of  tracking these
students and disbursing funds would have imposed a cost to the institu-
tions that would not exist if  the money applied to the semester during
which the student was enrolled in the classes.
When the decision was made by policymakers to replace the Merit with
the Promise Scholarship, the financial aid community was not consulted,
and the challenges of  implementation were not discussed. According to
our interviews with advisors to the commission process, formulation of
the MPS was informed largely by political negotiation rather than rational,
informed decision-making. As one advisor to the commission process
noted, “Okay we get our [political] victory in this in terms of  being able to
broaden the reach of  the [Merit] scholarship, so that literally every student
who graduates from high school has the potential to get it.” That political
win was important as it came at a time when the state legislature was
majority Republican in both houses and the Democratic governor had only
been in office for a year.
It is unclear whether a different mix of  commissioners would have
impacted the policy change, but a formal process of  testimony and delib-
eration would have had the dual effect of  informing the policymaking
process and minimizing potential resistance from interested groups, like
the financial aid community. Another advisor noted, “Well, you know,
some of  it I’m going to have to kind of  guesstimate to some extent
because you know our conversation, were not as extensive as you might
think …”
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The Governor’s advisors were never intentional about the end result of
the Commission, but they were influenced by the innovations and experi-
ences of  other states. The National Governor’s Association played an
important role facilitating the sharing of  best practices on college success.
Because the governor’s staff  was focused on establishing their legitimacy in
a heavily Republican-controlled legislature, they chose to move the process
quickly and without consulting the financial aid community – the group
responsible for administering financial aid programs on their respective
campuses. This group could have identified, anticipated, and planned for
(or avoided) these administrative challenges.
A Funding Gap for Students with Financial Need
Among financial aid offices, the single biggest concern for the Promise
Scholarship was the gap in funding it created for high-need students during
the semester they achieved eligibility. It was unanimous among those
participating in the focus group that the guidance from the U.S. Depart-
ment of  Education would force institutions to package the Promise
Scholarship in anticipation of  successful completion of  the requirements.
Doing so left a gap in the student aid package that could not be filled by
other forms of  federal aid. In our follow up survey, we found that cam-
puses typically bridged that gap for low income students in anticipation of
reclaiming those funds once students became eligible.
The legislature did not attend to the details of  implementation at the
institutional level, but it did attempt to influence institutions in a different
way. The legislation stated:
390.1627 (4) An approved postsecondary institution shall not consider
a Michigan Promise grant in determining a student’s eligibility for a
financial aid program administered by this state. It is the intent of  the
legislature than an approved postsecondary educational institution
does not reduce other institutionally funded student aid for which a
student is eligible because of  the student’s receipt of  or eligibility for a
Michigan Promise grant (Act 479, p. 4).
According to the legislation, policymakers stipulated that the award
should not be counted in the financial aid package. The second sentence
suggests however, that the real concern for policymakers is that institutions
do not replace potential institutional aid with the Promise grant. This
legislative language is inconsistent with the federal process for calculating
student eligibility for aid. All eligible colleges and universities utilize either
the federal methodology to calculate a student’s expected family contribu-
tion (EFC) or institutional methodology. Financial need is then calculated
as the difference between the cost of  attending (COA) the institution and
the EFC.
To illustrate, consider a low-income student living at home and commut-
ing to campus and is attending an institution whose combined costs of
tuition, fees, books and supplies is $15,000. The student qualified for a full
Pell grant (approximately $4,700 at the time), the maximum subsidized
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Stafford loan of  $3,500, and a federal work-study award ($3,000 for the
purpose of  illustration). The difference between the cost of  attendance
(COA) and the EFC in this scenario is $3,800, which is likely to be covered
by some combination of  institutional aid, outside scholarships, family
resources and additional student loans. The MPS award has the effect of
reducing the student’s financial need, even though this student will not
receive the money until after the eligibility requirements have been met and
verified. If  the student in this example was scheduled to receive the full
MPS award after earning 60 credits, $4,000 would reduce financial need to
zero, meaning the student would be required to pay out of  pocket when
their tuition bill was due.
At the same time, institutions were required to assume the costs of
administering the program, particularly for students who left the institution
after becoming eligible for the award. Financial aid officers were able to
apply all or part of  those funds to offset outstanding balances on student
accounts. According to Michigan Promise legislation, institutions would
not receive Promise Scholarship money from the state until the October
following the verification of  student eligibility – as many as 11 months
after some students became eligible. One financial aid director summarized
it this way:
Another cumbersome process was the “Application for Final Pay-
ment.” Students had to complete this form no later than the Novem-
ber 15th deadline following their year four in college or risk losing
eligibility. For example, the class of  2007 entering college in 2007-2008
would need to complete their academic requirements by 2010-2011
and apply for final payment no later than November 15, 2012. Payment
would then be sent to the last institution the student attended, not
directly to the student. It would then be up to the institution to know
the whereabouts of  the student. At that time, funds returned to an
institution as undeliverable would have to be [reverted] back to the
State by the institution.
The 11-month lag was problem enough, but the legislation allowed
students to delay applying for the funds for up to four years, at which time,
they may be even more difficult to find. The second and more complicated
problem was packaging the aid program. Based upon guidance from the
U.S. Department of  Education, institutions were instructed to package the
aid during the semester students were expected to become eligible. The
MPS award would reduce their financial need, which left a gap in their
package at the beginning of  the semester when they had to pay the balance
on their account. For example, a student that did not qualify for staggered
payments was eligible for $4,000 at the end of  the second year. At the
beginning of  the term, during which they were expected to earn 60 credits,
the $4,000 would reduce students’ financial need.
Given what is known about the influences of  financial aid on student
persistence through college, the credit-contingent approach appears likely
to have created a barrier for low income, first generation, and minority
students. If  the merit scholarship is any indication of  who will achieve
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proficiency in the four subject areas on the MME, then fewer than half  of
all students received any of  the Promise Scholarship up front, meaning
they would have a gap in their package the semester during which they
become eligible. For low-income students in particular, a $4,000 gap in a
single semester is a large amount to cover until the award is granted.
Elimination of the Promise Scholarship
The elimination of  the Michigan Promise Scholarship was a particular
issue for students who had achieved eligibility upon earning 60 credits with
a 2.5 GPA; it was also an issue for students graduating high school who
had achieved proficiency on the MME. One financial aid director noted:
…November 5, 2009 the financial aid community was updated on the
Fiscal Year 2009-2010 State budget. The appropriation for higher
education, Public Act 132 of  2009 had been enacted. The Michigan
Promise was listed nowhere…as being funded. Instead, the financial
aid community was notified that Pursuant to P.A. 132 of  2009, funding
was not provided for the Michigan Promise Scholarship for the
current fiscal year 2009-2010. Therefore, all Promise payments for all
class years, beginning with the Class of  2008, was suspended. This
suspension applied to both installment and final payments. No new
rosters of  eligible students would be forwarded to colleges and
students would no longer be able to certify their awards. This news
came after the academic year had already begun, and students were left
with a hole in their award package. A majority of  the 15 Public institu-
tions felt the need to step up and assist in some way, even if  minimally
to help fill the gap created by the loss of  the Michigan Promise Award
students and families were counting on. Financially, schools did what
they could to help make things right for the student, while the State
had broken their promise.
While it was not the subject of  this investigation, the loss of  the $4,000
MPS likely had an effect on Michigan undergraduates. Students and
families who anticipated the $4,000 now had to find other sources of
support on very short notice. The effects were not insignificant. For
example, nearly 2,000 students at Wayne State University lost a combined
total of  over $3,400,000 in 2009-10. The result was an organized demon-
stration attracting over 600 students in Detroit. Similar demonstrations
were held at the state capitol in Lansing.
Financial aid directors reported that the elimination of  the program may
have been more problematic if  two conditions did not exist. First, a larger
share of  the MPS was awarded to students without financial need. For
these students the loss of MPS did not appear to affect enrollment.
Instead of  leaving school, these students found other resources to cover
their college costs. The timing was problematic, however, even for more
economically advantaged families as it came at a time when state support
for higher education was declining, prices were rising, and the economic
recession was at or near its peak. While it did not substantially affect
institutional persistence or completion rates in the near term, it affected
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the household budgets of  both independent students and the families of
dependent students.
The second mediating influence for students was that 13 of  the 15
public four year universities replaced all or most of  the loss of  funding for
students with at least some financial need during the 2009-10 academic
year. This reduced the immediate concern for students and defused the
issue temporarily. The following year, several institutions maintained
commitments to meet financial need for a number of  students who would
have qualified for the MPS. Wayne State, for example, maintains a commit-
ment to meet the cost of tuition and fees with a combination of the
expected family contribution and federal, state and institutional grant
funds. Fortunately, Federal Pell Grant funding increased the maximum
amount by $619 to $5,350 in 2009-10 (U.S. Department of  Education,
2009), helping to offset some of the lost state funds for high-need stu-
dents.
Our findings suggest that the MPS was created as a political solution
(expand state aid) to an educational problem (low-degree completion),
during a particular window of  opportunity and political process (Cherry
Commission). The decision was rationalized to promote college access,
which resonates with an established statewide goal to double the number
of  college graduates in Michigan. The MPS was constructed absent any
involvement of  the financial aid community – particularly those respon-
sible for awarding financial aid across the state – or interest groups like the
Michigan Student Financial Aid Association (MSFAA). The result was a
policy decision motivated by a concern over college completion rates that
failed to account for the challenges of  implementation at the institutional
level.
The policy was crafted as part of  a political process that was not de-
signed to address financial aid or the rising cost of  college for students and
families. The MPS left a gap in financial aid packages for eligible students
during the semester the institution anticipated they would earn the credit.
For low- and middle-income students qualifying for other forms of  aid,
packaging the MPS before the credits were earned resulted in a gap in
funding until the credits could be verified and reimbursements issued by
the state. The verification and award process in turn, placed an additional
administrative burden on institutions that were required to reimburse the
money to individuals, whether or not they continued enrollment at the
college or university. Due to the elimination of  MPS, a number of  cam-
puses experienced an additional cost because they had chosen to cover the
gap with institutional resources, assuming the state awards would cover the
cost. Student aid packages were processed before institutions were aware
that the program would be eliminated and universities were not reimbursed
for institutional aid they provided to fill the gap in 2010. The number of
students that met the threshold prior to May 2010 was modest, but it could
have been much more costly had the program had remained in place for
another year. As it was, campuses had to deal with a cohort of  students
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The credit contingent mechanism was an innovative strategy to create an
incentive for students to complete their degrees, particularly at the two-year
level, but as this analysis has shown, the approach was fraught with imple-
mentation challenges that undermined the goals of  the program. One
important problem was that the policy was crafted without consulting the
financial aid community. Both Peterson (1983) and Marcus and Johnson
(1986) note the importance of  bringing, data, theory, and research to bear
during a Blue Ribbon Commission. Financial aid directors or representa-
tives of  MSFAA could have spoken to the challenges of  the credit-
contingent merit-aid program but they were not involved for two reasons –
financial aid was not explicitly part of  the commission agenda and deci-
sions related to design and implementation were made by a small group of
policymakers in order to generate a “win” for the Governor.
The larger implication here is that neglecting the implementation process
during the design of  the program introduces an added expense to the
campuses to track students for award reimbursements and places a number
of  students in the untenable position of  covering a sizable expense above
and beyond their EFC. What the U.S. Department of  Education and the
state failed to take into account was the potential scenario that a student
would fail to meet either criteria. If  a student failed a course or otherwise
withdrew from a course (or more) during the semester, the student who
anticipated to become eligible for the award ran the risk of  falling short of
the 60 credit criteria. Similarly, the same student might have failed to
achieve the necessary 2.5 cumulative GPA. Both scenarios left the student
assuming all the risk. Given they would not be eligible to cover that gap
with federal student loans, they were likely to turn to the private markets
where interest rates were considerably higher, if  such loans were even
available at all. Failure to meet the 60 credit criteria, at minimum, delayed
the award by a full semester, and in rare cases, a student may have finished
school without attaining the requisite 2.5 GPA and thus be denied the
award.
The message for policymakers should be clear. Higher education is
subject to a set of  frequently competing goals, which play out in terms of
policy preferences. The MPS was designed to incentivize students to finish
two years of  postsecondary education. Political pressures at the state level
to replace a problematic merit program with something both more robust
and also tenable to a Republican legislature created the conditions for
advancing a partially developed solution. While the goal may have been
consistent with the priorities of  the state, it did not account for how these
policies were actually implemented and what impact they may have had on
the experiences of  students. At a minimum, the financial aid community
should have been a part of  the conversation when this new scholarship
was proposed.
In 2010, amidst severe budget cuts across state spending and persistently
deep cuts to higher education, the state legislature eliminated the Michigan
Promise Scholarship. The financial aid directors at the public four-year
institutions had already argued that the MPS was not the best option for
using state funds to help more students complete a postsecondary degree
or credential. Recently, this group had proposed a need-based grant to
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replace the defunct MPS if  Michigan is ever in a position to re-establish a
signature financial aid program. The state was hard hit by the national
recession, the effects of  which were felt earlier in Michigan than in the rest
of  the nation, given the challenges facing the automotive industry in the
middle part of  the decade. After six years, revenues have exceeded projec-
tions for the first time, meaning at some point in the future, Michigan may
be in a financial position to return some portion of  funding to higher
education.
The Michigan experience should be a cautionary tale for any state
rethinking its financial aid priorities; it should serve as a reminder to the
financial aid community that they must find ways to engage in the
policymaking process. Policymakers are not elected because of  any special
expertise in the areas over which they craft legislation; rather, they are at
best experts in the policy process. It is not reasonable to expect them to
know the intricacies of  the financial aid system, but they should be aware
of  their limitations and find ways to include relevant stakeholders, particu-
larly those responsible for implementation. Similarly, financial aid directors
are not interested in creating policy, but they understand the implication of
policy for their work, and are willing to participate in the process. They
understand how these programs affect students, and in many cases, are
able to anticipate the potential consequences of  proposed policy initiatives
impacting financial aid.
We conclude with two recommendations for financial aid professionals
across the country. First, find ways to connect to the policymaking process.
For many financial aid professionals, that may mean active participation in
state student financial aid associations or some other legislatively oriented
advocacy organization. Others may consider direct relationships with
elected state legislators. In order to be heard at the policymaking table, you
have to find your way into the conversation. One particular useful resource
is NASFAA’s Federal Relations Tool Kit (2012), which assists financial aid
administrators as they work with federal relations staff  at their institutions
to advocate for improved student aid legislation. Second, be prepared with
a set of  ideas or legislative priorities that can be pulled out at the appropri-
ate time. One of  the important lessons learned in Michigan was that the
political winds of  change blow in unpredictable ways and, as it turns out,
those winds can blow frequently. It is difficult to know when the next
window of  opportunity will arise for policy action on financial aid, but
financial aid professionals do not want to wait until that window opens to
think about alternative solutions. By the time a proposal is developed, the
political window will close and those ideas will have to wait until the next
strong wind blows.
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